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INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL LIABILITY OF BANK
DIRECTORS FOR NEGLIGENT AND
EXCESS LOANS
Introduction
The wholesale failure of banking institutions throughout
the country during this period of deflated land values and
other securities, has brought into prominence and is now
developing that field of the law dealing with the liability
of the directors and officers of defunct banking corporations..
Thousands of bankers and "figure head directors" have
fallen heir to civil litigation by virtue of their titular offices.
The service of summons, to many of these, is a thunder-bolt
from a clear sky and their first knowledge that the law im-
poses an affirmative duty upon them as bank officers and
directors. It is that duty and the resultant civil liability
for the neglect of same that forms the avowed purpose of
this article.
No field of the law can be approached as an exact science,
and that part of the law dealing with directors liability
is no exception, necessitating a general survey of the basic
principles underlying that liability,-principles which should
be matters 6f common knowledge and have been too infre-
quently called to the attention of our bankers and general
public.
The civil liability of bank directors for making bad loans
may arise either under the common law or under special
statute such as the excess loAn statutes in force in many
jurisdictions. We will therefore discuss this liability un-
der two heads:
I. THE COMMON LAw LIABILITY
It may be stated as a general proposition that there is
a common law liability apart from statutory liability, of
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bank officers and directors for failure and neglect in the
performance of their duties.'
An early New York decision gives us the reason for hold-
ing directors liable for their negligence under the common
law, in the following language:
"When one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock in a cor-
poration, thus divesting himself of the immediate control of his prop-
erty, he expects, and has the right to expect, that the trustees or di-
rectors who are chosen to take his place in the management and con-
trol of his property, will exercise ordinary care and prudence in the
trusts committed to them ....
"When one voluntarily takes the position of trustee or director of
a corporation, good faith, exact justice, and public policy unite in
requiring of him such degree of care and prudence, and it is a gross
breach of duty-crassa negligentia-not to bestow them." 2
A. Actions-How Liability May Be Raised
1. Actions at Law
The question of who may raise this liability and how it
may be raised has led to a great diversity of opinion but
the general rule seems to be, that no action at law can be
maintained against bank directors by a creditor or deposi-
tor for mismanagemerit and negligence that may be a wrong
against the corporation and of consequent damage to the
creditor.'
The reason for the rule, as set out, is the lack of privity
or contractual relation between the parties. The courts
have reasoned that the duty to exercise diligence is one
owed to the corporation and not to the creditors whose in-
juries are incidental. The case of Zinn v'. Mendel," follow-
ing the above rule, also gives ai additional reason for not
1 Thomas v. Taylor, 224 U. S. 73 (1912) ; Bowerman v. Hamner, 63 L. Ed.
1113 (1919); Allen v. Luke, 163 Fed. 1018 (1908); Commercial Bank v. Chat-
field, 127 Mich. 407 (1901); Ellis v. H. P. Gates Mercantile Co., 103 Miss. 560,
60 So. 649, Ann. Cases, 1915 B, 526 and note; 3 R. C. L. 458.
2 Hun v. Carey, 82 N. Y. 65 (1880).
3 Bailey v. Moser, 63 Fed. 488 (1894); U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Coming State
Savings Bank, 154 Ia. 588 (1912); Smith v. Hurd, 12 Met. (Mass) 371, 46 Am.
Dec. 690 (1847); Brown v. Orr, 112 Pa. 233 (1886).
4 9 W. Va. 580 (1876).
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permitting the depositor to bring an action at law for dam-
ages in his own right:
"Upon consideration, it seems to me that, if actions for the cause
stated in the plaintiff's declaration against directors of banks and other
corporations were sustained by the courts of law, it would be highly
detrimental to the public interest and not conducive to justice.
Thoughtless impulse and passions might for a time justify it, but
sober, sound thought and reason must and will condemn it; if not at
once, surely in a reasonable time. Banking institutions and other
corporations are essential to the welfare and prosperity of the country
and these institutions cannot generally be operated save through the
agency of directors, and if the directors of such institutions were held
liable at law to the creditors thereof in damages for every act and
negligence in the management and disposition of the moneys and
property of the corporation, of which the corporation might lawfully
complain, responsible men could not be found who would take upon
themselves the perils and dangers of the position."
The ruie that the depositor cannot bring an action at
law in his own right against the directors of the bank for
negligence, is not without its exceptions, and there are a
few cases that hold a contrary opinion. In those instances
the actions have been maintained on the theory that the
directors are trustees for creditors. Notable among those
decisions is the case of Delano v. Case,5 which was an ac-
tion by a general depositor against the directors of the
bank for negligence. The court stated in opinion:
"For the ordinary negligence of directors, they are responsible alone
to their principal, but, for such gross negligence or incompetency as
shows a reckless disregard of their duty to care for and protect the
funds committed to their charge, we think they are directly responsible
to the depositor."
2. Equity Actions
The same conflict of opinion is found regarding suits in
equity in the creditor's own name, but' it is generally con-
ceded by the courts that depositors may bring a suit in
equity in the nature of a creditors' bill to charge the directors
5 17 IM. App. 531 (1885).
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with fraud, mismanagement and negligence.6 Of course the
receiver of an insolvent bank, being the principal, no ques-
tion of privity of contract or tort arises when he sues the
directors of the defunct bank for their negligence or losses
on negligent loans. Such suits are brought properly in
equity and are usually in the nature of an accounting.
It may be concluded then, that, apart from any statutory
liability, there is a duty imposed upon bank directors, the
neglect of which may result in a direct personal liability
for the loss occasioned by mismanagement or negligence in
handling of banking affairs, which liability may be extended
to include losses on loans negligently made.
B. The Common Law Duty of Bank Directors
The question of what the common law duty of bank di-
rectors is, and what constitutes a breach of it, becomes im-
portant to a discussion of the subject. The duty imposed
upon the director under the common law, the existence of
which has been pointed out, is to act in good faith and with
ordinary care and diligence as ordinarily prudent men would
exercise with reference to the conduct of such a moneyed
institution.7
Thompson defines the duties of directors, in his Com-
mentaries on the Law of Private Corporations, as follows:
"By accepting the position, they assume a capacity to manage the
business of the corporation, and impliedly undertake to use as much
diligence and care as the proper performance of the duties of their
office requires, and to give the enterprise the benefit of their best care
and judgment. They are bound to manage the affairs of the company
with the same degree of care and prudence which is generally exer-
cised by business men in the management of their own affairs, and
the fact of the service without compensation does not permit a less
degree of activity. They must be diligent and careful in performing
the duties they have undertaken, and imprudence and negligence can-
6 Foster v. Bank of Abingdon, 88 Fed. 604 (1898); McEwen v. Keley,
140 Ga. 720, 79 S. E. 777 (1913); Wilkenson v. Bauerle, 41 N. J. Eq. 635, 7 At.
514 (1886); Gores v. Field, 109 Wis. 408 (1901).
7 3 R. C. L. 459.
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not be excused on the ground of ignorance or inexperience, or the
honesty of intention." 8
The following, from a late decision of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court, summarizes the relation in which a bank di-
rector stands to the public. The court states the following
with reference to his duties as an officer of the bank:
"Banks themselves are prone to state, and hold out to the public,
who compose their boards of directors. The idea is not to be tolerated
-that they serve as merely gilded ornaments of the institution, to en-
hance its attractiveness, or that -their reputations should be used as
a lure to customers. What the public suppose, and have the right
to suppose, is that those men have been selected by reason of their high
character for integrity, their sound judgment, and their capacity for
conducting the affairs of the bank safely and securely.
"Directors of banking corporations occupy one of the most im-
portant and responsible of all business relations to the general public.
By accepting the position and holding themselves out to the public
as such, they assume that they will supervise and give direction to
the affairs of the corporation . . . It is the duty of the directors to
know the condition of the corporation whose affairs they voluntarily
assume to control, and they are presumed to know that Which it is
their duty to know, and which they have the means of knowing." 9'
C. The Degree of Care
The degree of care required of directors in their handling
of banking affairs, has been generally stated as, that care
which men of ordinary prudence would exercise under
similar circumstances and that in determining such degree of
care the restrictions of the banking laws and usages of busi-
ness would be taken into account. 0 The question resolves
itself into one of fact to be determined by all the circum-
stances in each given case," inasmuch as each case is one
that must be tried upon its own peculiar facts and surround-
ing circumstances. It is impossible to definitely define what
8 THOMPSON, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 1268.
9 Kienke v. Kirsch, 238 N. W. 33 (Neb. 1931).
10 Briggs v. Spalding, 141 U. S. 132 (1891); Movins v. Lee, -30 Fed. 298
(1887); Bourn v. Perkins, 42 Fed. (2d) 94 (1930).
11 Rankin v. Cooper, 149 Fed. 1010 (1907).
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is expected of directors as a general rule, but a few broad
principles of liability have been developed and are applied
by the courts to these particular types of cases, which prin-
ciples are reflected by a consideration of various decisions,
Foremost, perhaps, among defenses commonly urged by
bank directors are the defenses of ignorance, inexperience,
and honesty of intention. The general impression among
directors seems to be that they are not liable for anything
but actual fraud, or some affirmative act of mal-administra-
tion. But the bank director is liable also for acts of negli-
gent omission. The courts have held that the absence of
improper motive or desire for personal profit on the part
of the directors is no defense to an action for negligent
management and loss on loans negligently made.'" They
have even gone so far as to hold that a director cannot be
excused from liability when he voluntarily remains in office,
although his advanced age has made it difficult for. him to
properly perform his duties as a director. 3 It has been fur-
ther suggested by some courts that if a director is not able to
influence the rest of the board in properly conducting the
affairs of the bank that he should sever all connections with
the bank in order to avoid further personal liability. 4 The
Bank director will not be permitted to be shielded from lia-
bility because of ignorance of wrong-doing and especially
where such ignorance is the result of gross inattention. 5
Another common defense advanced by bank directors sued
for derelictions in duty is predicated on the fact, that, in
the conduct of banking affairs, it is necessary to delegate
powers of management to a certain degree. The directors
taking advantage of this circumstance then claim that they
are unaware of the negligent acts of the cashier, or one to
whom such powers have been delegated. This defense has
12 McRoberts v. Spaulding, 32 Fed. (2d) 315 (Iowa 1929).
13 Stone v. Rottman, 183 Mo. 552 (1904); Ford v. Taylor, 4 S. W. (2d)
938 (Ark. 1928).
14 Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N. E. 42 (Mass. 1930).
15 Bowerman v. Hamner, op. cit. supra note 1.
\ #
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been exploded by the courts. It has been held that where
it is necessary to delegate powers of management in any
degree, it is the duty of the directors to exert a reasonable
supervision of management and that their want of knowl-
edge of the wrong-doing of officers in the bank will not ex-
cuse the directors from liability if it is the result of their
gross inattention.
Thompson, in his Commentaries on the Law of Private
Corporations, has the following to say on this subject:
"They (directors) are not permitted to evade their power or important
duties and their supervision must be such as would enable them at
all times to know the general financial condition of the corporation
and to check or prevent any imprudent or dishonest conduct in offi-
cials . . . They are bound to know the character and habits of the
officers whom they employ . . . and they aite responsible for losses
resulting from the wrongful acts or omissions of other directors or
agents, where such loss was a consequence of their own neglect of
duty, either in failing to supervise the company's business with proper
attention, or in neglecting to use proper care in the appointment of
such agents." 16
Excuses on the part of negligent directors such as ill
health, non-residence and solicitation are common among
defenses. These excuses as defenses have also been denied
by the courts. Their practically unanimous opinion is, that
the directors are not excused from liability for the making
of bad loans, or other negligence by virtue of the fact that
they live several hundred miles away from the bafik.
The court said in the case of Bowerman v. Hamner:"7
"It would be a reproach to the law to permit his residence at a dis-
tance from the location of the bank, a condition which existed from
the time he first assumed the office of director, to serve as an excuse
for' his utter abdication of his common law responsibility for the con-
duct of its affairs and for the flagrant violation of his oath of office
when it resulted in loss to others."
The same theory has been applied to the excuses of ill
health and solicitation.18
16 T opsoN, op. d'. supra note 8.
17 Bowerman v. Hamner, op. cit. supra note 1.
18 MORSE, BANKS AND BA xKxc (1928) Vol. ., § 128.
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One further common defense among directors sued for
their negligence and resultant loss on bad loans is that they
did not examine the records of the bank and had no knowl-
edge that any negligent loans were ever made, or that such
loans had never been called to their attention, as the records
of such loans had never been submitted for their examina-
tion. The directors cannot be heard to say that they were
ignorant of the facts surrounding the making of the loan
when its existence is shown by the books and records of the
bank, and where it would have been known to them but
for their negligence or inattention to the business and failure
to familiarize themselves with the records of the bank. It
is the duty of bank directors in the absence of statute to
examine papers and effects of the bank, to familiarize them-
selves with its business and affairs, and know to whom the
principal lines of credit have been extended.' 9
Concluding this discussion regarding some of the general
principles that the courts have applied to suits against di-
rectors on their common law liability for negligent manage-
ment of bank affairs, including the making of poor loans,
we may observe that, even upon a cursory examination of
the law and the duty imposed upon directors by the common
law, the office of bank director is one of responsibility; that
those accepting the office of directors assume at the same
time the legal responsibility to diligently manage the affairs
of the bank, falling short of which they may become per-
sonally liable for loss on loans and other damage caused by
their neglect of duties. The idea, or notion that the office
of a bank director is a passive, honorary position desirable
for social standing and prestige in the community, is not
tolerated by the law and most certainly should not be coun-
tenanced by the public.
19 Spongberg v. First National Bank, 18 Ida. 524, 110 Pac. 713, Ann. Cases,
1912 -A, 95 and note; Gund v. Ballard, 80 Ne'.. 385, 114 N. W. 420 (1907).
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II. EXCESS LoANs
A. General
In several states a statutory liability has been imposed
on bank directors for making excess loans. These statutes
governing state banks are similar to the federal excess loan
statute governing loans in national banks. The constitu-
tionality of legislation along this line has been questioned
at different times, but to no avail, 20 it having been decided
that such legislation does not deprive the bank directors of
equal protection of the law. In our consideration of the
excess loan statutes we will not dwell, therefore, upon con-
stitutional questions, but rather turn to a discussion of the
judicial interpretation of these statutes.
Many practical problems of pleading confront the lawyer
in bringing suit against the directors of a bank for exces
loans. One must keep in mind the fact that directors are
not released from their common law duty to administer af-
fairs of the bank by statutory provisions regarding excess
loans.2 It has also been held that suits against the dl-
rectors for excess loans are properly subjects of equitable
jurisdiction 22 and that a prayer for an accounting is appro-
priate and pertinent for the purpose of ascertaining the
amount necessary to be recovered to pay losses and to ad-
just the liability of the several directors, some of whom may
have served as directors longer or at different times than
others.23 It has been held that a bill in equity to obtain
an accounting and decree for money lost by negligence may
be framed so that if the evidence fails to establish statutory
20 See discussion of cases questioning the constitutionality of legislation
fixing liability of directors collected in Note, 57 A. L. R. 888.
21 Bowerman v. Hamner, op. ci. supra note 1; Allen v. Luke, 163 Fed.
1018 (1908).
22 Freeman v. Jackson, 227 Fed. 688 (1915); Wells v. Graves, 41 Fed. 459
(1890); Briggs v. Spalding, op. cit. supra note 10; Rogers v. Sellick, 221 N. W.
702 (Neb. 1928); Adams v. Clark, 22 Fed. (2d) 957 (1927); Ventress v. Wallace,
111 Miss. 357, 71 So. 636, L. R. A. 1917 A, 971 (1916).
23 Shannon v. Mabley, 143 S. E. 582 (Ga. 1928).
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negligence, but establishes common law negligence, a decree
may be entered accordingly and thus the necessity for a
resort to a second suit is avoided. 24  The inference might
be drawn therefore that in states where an excess loan
statute exists a suit could be framed in equity to include
both negligent loans and excess loans. This procedure
would seem to be further borne out by the following general
proposition of law:
"A complaint is not deemed to unite several causes of action simply
because it sets forth several grounds on which the defendant might be
liable in respect to the same transaction. Several grounds for lia-
bility may be assigned in one count. Thus in an action against the
directors or stockholders of a corporation, seeking to .charge them
personally with the debt of the corporation the complaint is not to be
deemed as uniting several causes of action in one count, because it sets
forth several grounds on either of which the defendants would be
liable." 25
If the foregoing rule is correct, then, as a matter of plead-
ing, common law and statutory grounds for liability set
out in the same suit is permissible, and the same loan might
be declared upon as both negligent under the common law
and excess under the statute.
As we discuss the question of statutory liability for ex-
cess loans it may be well also to keep in mind the fact
that the liability of a director survives against his estate, 2
and that the living directors of a bank may be joined with
the executors of deceased directors in a suit for negligence
and excess loans.27
24 Bowerman v. Hamner, op. cit. supra note 1; Gamble v. Brown, 29 Fed.
(2d) 366 (1928). See: Chesbrough v. Woodworth, 224 U. S. 72, 61 L. Ed.
1000 (1916), for joinder of parties defendant, holding that action may be brought
against one, or all the defendants where the liability foi excess loans is made
both joint and several. Cf. Curtis v. Metcalfe, 265 Fed. 293 (1918), where a
separate statement against each director was held necessary where there are a
great number of directors holding office at different times.
25 ENcyc. OF -'!. AND Pa., Vol. V, pp. 309-311.
26 Williams v. Brady, 232 Fed. 740 (1916); Stevens v. Overstaolz, 43 Fed.
465 (1890); Bates v. Dresser, 229 Fed. 772 (1915); Ranchman's State Bank v.
Lenning, 220 N. W. 485 (S. D.'1928).
27 Allen v. Luke, 163 Fed. 1018 (1908).
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B. Statutes
A comparison of some of the excess loan statutes now
in force in different jurisdictions will serve as a basis for
drawing certain general conclusions concerning their con-
struction, and for the further purpose of showing that the
cause of action with its different elements of liability created
under these several statutes, is essentially the same.
The Kentucky excess loan statute 2 reads:
"If any director or directors of any bank shall knowingly violate or
permit any officer or employee of the bank to violate any provisions of
the laws relating to banks, the directors so offending shall be jointly and
severally individually liable to the creditors and stockholders for any
loss or damage resulting from such violation."
-The same statute then sets a limit for loans as follows:
"No bank shall permit any of its stockholders, or any person, com-
pany, or firm .. . to become indebted to it in a sum exceeding twenty
per cent of its capital stock actually paid in and its actual amount of
surplus unless such borrower pledge with it good and sufficient col-
lateral security or execute to it a mortgage upon real or personal estate
which at the time is of more than the cash value of such loan or in-
debtedness above all other encumbrances; and if the borrower is a
director or officer of such bank it shall not be permitted to become
indebted to it in excess of ten per cent of its paid up capital stock
without securing the excess . .. and in no event shall the indebtedness
of any person, company, or firm including in the liabilitiy of the com-
pany or firm the liability of the individual members thereof, exceed
thirty per cent of its paid up capital and actual surplus."
.The South Dakota Statute 29 on the subject reads:
"Every officer and director of any bank shall be held personally liable
for all excessive loans made by his bank, in such amount as such loan
may be in excess of the amountlimited by law, and his liability there-
on shall be the same as though such paper was endorsed by him, but
to the extent only of the excessive amount . . ."
The Nebraska Statute " is as follows:
"No corporation transacting a banking business in this state shall
directly or indirectly loan to any single corporation, firm or individual,
28 See Wickliffe v. Turner, 157 S. W. 1125 (Ky. 19i3).
29 § 9890 REv. CODE O S. D. (1919).
80 §§ 8-150, CoMi. Ss. or NEB. (1929).
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including in such loans all loans made to the several members or
share holders of such firm or corporation, for the use and benefit of
such corporation, firm or individual, more than twenty per cent of
the paid up capital and surplus of such bank . . .In case of such
violation, every director who participated in, or knowingly assented
to the same, shall be held liable in his personal and individual capacity
for all damages which the bank, its shareholders, or any other person
shall have sustained in consequence of such violation."
Missouri and Ohio have similar statutes to those above
set out.
The Federal Statute s' provides for a loan limit of ten
per cent in the following language:
"If the directors of any national banking association shall knowingly
violate, or knowingly permit any of the provisions of this title, all
the rights and privileges and franchises of the association shall be
thereby forfeited .. .And in cases of such violation, every director
who participated in or assented to the same shall be held liable in his
personal and individual capacity for all damages which the associa-
tion, its shareholders, or any other person shall have sustained in
consequence of such violation."
The purpose of the enactment of all these statutes is
pointed out in the case of Wickliffe v. Turner,2 where the
court says:
"The statute was designed for the protection of the bank, its de-
positors, and stockholders, and must be liberally construed with a view
to promote its purposes. That clause of the statute will in every
case be applied which best protects the bank, its depositors and stock-
holders . . . The statute was designed to protect the bank against
the risk of heavy loss by reason of an indebtedness being created to
it from one person above the limits prescribed."
C. Construction of Statutes
1. Prerequisites of Liability
The construction of state excess loan statutes by the
state courts does not seem to be as well defined, or as well
developed, as the law construing the Federal excess loan
statute. This is the reason no doubt that in the construc-
31 U. S. CODE ANN., Title 12, § 93, p. 212.
82 157 S. W. 1125 (Ky. 1913).
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tion of the state statutes reference is frequently made, and
the decisions are usually based, upon the precedent set by
the Federal courts in construction of the national bank
excess loan statute. For this reason we will deal more
particularly with the construction of the Federal statute
in our discussion of statutory construction.
From a comparison of the wording of the statutes hereto-
fore set out it is evident that the liabilities imposed upon
directors are similar. In other words the elements of lia-
bility, or necessary proofs and allegations going to make
up a prima facie case against the directors are essentially
the same. For instance, each statute contemplates as an
element of liability, that the person sought to be charged
must have been a duly qualified and acting director at the
time of the statutory violation. It can be readily seen that
no liability under the statute could be imposed upon one by
virtue of his office who did not come under the express pro-
visions of the statute.
In the second place the liability in most. instances, includ-
ing liability under the Federal statute, seems to have been
made contingent upon the directors having some knowledge
of the violations, whether it be actual or constructive.
Knowledge is an essential element of liability under most
statutes. The wording of the South Dakota statute, how-
ever, would seem to create a personal liability for excess
loans precluding a possible defense based on lack of knowl-
edge, or assent to the making of same. Generally, it may
be concluded that a second element of the liability common
to most excess loan statutes is the requirement of knowledge,
assent, or actual participation on the part of the directors,
charged with the liability under the statute, to the making
of the loan in question. The rules developed in suits un-
der the Common Law against directors for negligent loans
and mismanagement have been applied to the statutory
actions for excess loans. An examination of the opinion in
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the late case of White v. Thomas 33 shows how closely these
decisions, heretofore mentioned in this article, have been
followed under statute where knowledge on the part of
the director is made a necessary element of his liability.
" 'Directors cannot in justice to those who deal with the bank, shut
their eyes to what is going on around them . . .
"'It is the right and duty of the board to maintain a supervision
of the affairs of the bank; to have a general knowledge of the manner
in which its business is conducted and of the character of that busi-
ness; and to have at least such a degree of intimacy with its affairs
as to know to whom and upon what security its large lines of credit
are given; and generally to know of and give direction with regard
to the important and general affairs of the bank over which the
cashier executes the details . . . The idea is not to be tolerated that
they serve as merely gilded ornaments of the institution to enhance
its attractiveness or that their reputation should be used as a lure
to customers. What the public suppose, and have the right to sup-
pose, is that those men have been selected by reason of their high
character for integrity and sound judgment and their capacity for
conducting the affairs of the bank safely and securely. The public
act on this presumption and trust their property with the bank in the
confidence that the directors will discharge a substantial duty . ..
It is inconsistent with the purpose or policy of the banking act that
its vital interest should be committed to one man without oversight
and control.' "
In the third place, as a prerequisite of liability under ex-
cess loan statutes, is the proof that the line of credit sued
upon is a single line of credit, as the statutory liability hinges
upon the theory of an over extension of credit to a single
firm or individual. In determining whether the line of
credit sued on was extended to such single individual or
firm, all the facts and circumstances must be taken into
consideration, and any subterfuges by which a "dummy"
borrower is extended credit for the use of another must be
scrutinized carefully.
A fourth element of liability contemplated by all the
statutes limiting loans in banks is the proof that the loan
33 37 Fed. (2d) 452 (C. C. A. 9th Cir., 1929).
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sued upon is in excess of the statutory limit. This brings
us to the all important question of, what is an excess loan? 84
2. Excess Loan Defined
At first glance the question of what an excess loan is,
seems relatively simple, but closer investigation discloses
the fact that the question may become quite complicated
and involved. The rules laid down by the courts for deter-
mining what loans are excess are not difficult to follow, but
their application often results in confusion and leads to a
multitude of closely related problems of law. The courts
themselves have not been consistent in their views as to
what constitutes excess for which the directors may be
liable. It is obvious that an excess loan is one that in it-
self exceeds the prescribed statutory limit, or one that added
to the amout already owing to the bank from any given firm
or individual causes the total line of indebtedness to exceed
the statutory limit.
The definition of an excess loan is so closely related to the
damages recoverable in any given instance that a discussion
of the amount of damages for which the director is liable
may in itself lend clarity to the definition.
a. Measure of Damages in the Case of a Single
Excessive Loan
The construction given the Federal statute regarding the
computation of damages in the case of a single excessive
loan seems to represent the more recent holdings on the
subject. In order to make clear what is meant by a single
excess loan let us take as an example the instance where a
84 See City National Bank of Mangum v. Crow, 27 Okla. 107, 111 Pac. 210
(1910), for a discussion of the issues of fact in actions to recover from directors
for excess loans.
See Wickliffe v. Turner, op. cit. supra note 32, where it is held that it is
not material whether the bank lends the money to a person and takes his note
for it, or buys his paper from another, when the directors are sued under statute
for overloaning the limit of indebtedness.
It has been held that the liability of an indorser can not be added to a
line of loans to make it in excess of the statutory limit. Gamble v. Brown,
op. cit. supra note 24.
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bank has a capital stock of $100,000.00 and a surplus of
$100,000.00, the two aggregating $200,000.00. Twenty
thousand dollars then would be the limit under the Federal
statute. If, then, the bank should as a single transaction,
loan to a single firm or individual thirty thousand dollars,
that loan would be a single excess loan and the question
arises whether the participating directors would be liable
for only the loss on the ten thousand dollars constituting
the excess above the limit prescribed, or whether they would
be liable for the loss on the entire sum loaned. This proposi-
tion is discussed in the case of Corsicana National Bank v.
Johnson 11 and that discussion, as it affects the computation
of damages on a single excessive loan, is in part as follows:
"According to the evidence, the $30,000, less discount, was paid
out by the bank as a single payment; and, if the jury found it to
have been loaned in excess of the statutory limit (whether in form one
loan or two), it must be upon the ground that it was a single trans-
action . . . That being so it would follow that the entire amount dis-
bursed by the bank was disbursed in violation of the law. The caise
of action against a director knowingly participating in or assenting
to such excessive loan would be comnplete at that moment, and en-
tire; there would be no legal presumption that the borrowers would
have accepted a loan within the limit, if their application of the ex-
cessive loan had been refused; nor that a director who in fact violated
his duty as defined by law would if mindful of it, have loaned them
even $20,000. To mitigate in his favor the damages resulting from
a breach of his statutory duty by resorting to the hypothesis that,
if he had not disregarded the law in this respect, he would- have pur-
sued a different course of action within the law, would be an unwar-
ranted resort to fiction in aid of a wrongdoer, and at the expense of
the party injured. Hence the entire excessive loan would have to be
regarded as the basis for computing the damages of the bank."
This method of computing damages in the case of a
single excess loan has been followed by the Federal courts "
and the case above mentioned is one of the leading decisions
35 251 U. S. 68, 64 L. Ed. 141, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82 (1919).
36 'Rankin v. Cooper, 149 Fed. 1010 (C. C., W. D. Ark., 1907); Gamble v.
Brown, op. cit. supra note 24; Curtis v. Metcalfe, 265 Fed. 293 (D. C., D. R. I.,
1918).
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upon that subject. There are some decisions, however, in
the state courts that arrive at a different conclusion and it
has been argued in some instances that the directors are
not liable on the whole indebtedness, which created the ex-
cess, but are liable only for the excess itself, even in the
case of a single excess loan."'
b. Measure of Damages in the Case of a
Series of Loans
The question of liability in the case of a series of loans
totaling more than the prescribed statutory limit has been
evaded for the most part by the state, courts. The question
of the computation of damages where renewal notes include
a series of old notes and in addition new principal combined
with interest, has come before some state courts in construc-
tion of excess loan statutes, but was not passed upon square-
ly.88 The Federal statute, however, has been construed
with some degree of clarity and in a manner consistent with
the Federal court holdings in reference to a single excess
loan.
The difficulty of computation of damages where there are
a series of loans is greatly enhanced, and the probleMs
arising may be best illustrated by using an example. If
under the Federal statute the loan limit of a given bank
was $20,000.00, that being 10 % of the paid up capital stock
and surplus, and on a certain date there was due and owing
from A to the bank an aggregate of $17,000, representing a
series of loans that had been renewed from time to time,
and on that date a new loan of $7,000 was made to A, at
which time the old notes and the new loans were renewed
and evidenced by a new note of $24,000, the question arises
as to what extent the participating directors are liable on
this transaction. The Federal courts have construed the
87 Wickliffe v. Turner, op. cit. supra note 32; Sturges v: Barton, 8 Ohio St.
215 (1858).
38 National Bank of Rutland v. S. F. Paige's Executor, 53 Vt. 452 (1881);
Phoenix Third National Bank v. Martin, 293 S. W. 1064 (Ky. 1927).
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statute governing National Banks to create a liability for
the entire amount of the $7,000 loan, this being the loan
that was in itself excessive when added to the amount al-
ready owing from A to the bank?9 It will be observed that
this is consistent with the Federal court holdings in the
case of a single excess loan. The court in the case of
McRoberts v. Spalding 40 in laying down the rule for com-
putation of damages where there was a series of loans cites
the Corsicana National Bank case:
"It is held in the case of Corsicana National Bank v. Johnson that
the entire sum loaned plus the interest and less salvage, should be
treated as the damages sustained, and not merely the excess above
what lawfully might have been loaned when the entire excess loan
formed but a single transaction. The inference in this case being that,
if, in good faith and in the ordinary course of business, the defendants
made a loan equal to the amount authorized and later, while this loan
remained unpaid, as a separate transaction, unlawfully loaned addi-
tional money in excess of the prescribed limit, the damage legally at-
tributable to'their violation of the limiting provisions would be the
amount of the excess loan, and not the full amount."
So both in the case of a single excess loan and of a series
of excess loans, under the Federal statute, the liability of
the directors is determined, not by the amount that is over
the statutory limit, but by the entire amount of the loan
that is excess.4
c. Renewal Notes
There are many variations of the question of damage
computation that may be presented. Both the state courts
and the Federal courts have declared that a renewal of notes,
which adds only interest bringing the total line of credit
to exceed the statutory limit, does not constitute a new loan
for which directors can be held under the statute prohibit-
89 McRoberts v. Spaulding, op. cit. supra note 12.
40 Op. cit. supra note 12.
41 Adams v. Clarke, op. cit. supra note 22; McRoberts v. Spaulding, op. cit.
supra note 12; Gamble v. Brown, op. cit. supra note 24; Anderson v. Galley,
33 Fed. (2d) 589 (1929); Rankin v. Cooper, op. cit. supra note 36.
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ing excess loans.!2 It has also been held that if money in
the bank was misapplied prior to the time the directors
took office, or without their knowledge or approval, that
subsequent renewals of such paper upon which nothing is
added but accrued interest, does'not amount to a new loan
for'borrowed money.4" The theory adopted bythe courts
in this holding is that a renewal is not a loan, but merely
an extension of the time of payment."'
The courts conclude that as a matter of policy, once a
bad loan has been made the directors must do everything
possible to preserve the assets and are not only warranted
in taking a renewal, but are obligated to do so if it is the only
way to protect the bank assets. It may be concluded, then,
that in order to prove a loan excessive under the statute
it must be shown that new principal was loaned by virtue
of which the line of credit was made to exceed the statutory
limit.
d. Salvage and Interest
Regarding the subject of damages, it may be stated as a
general rule, that'salvage on notes may be deducted in miti-
gation of damages. The rule adopted by the Federal courts
in determining the extent of the directors liability for ex-
cess loans is "the entire sum loaned plus interest and less
salvage." "I But it has been held that while the directors
are entitled to the salvage in mitigation of damages for
excess loans, that the burden is on the director to show
the salvage since he becomes immediately .liable for the
whole amount, and further, that the director cannot require
42 McRoberts v. Spaulding, op. cit. supra note 12; Curtis v. Metcalfe, op.
cit. supra note 36; Coffin v. U. S., 162 U. S. 677, 16 S. C. 943, 40 L. Ed.
1109 (1896).
48 See cases referred to in note 42, supra.
44 Brown v. Marion National Bank, 169 U. S. 416, 18 S. C. 390, 42 L. Ed.
801 (1898).
45 Corsicana National Bank v. Johnson, op. cit. supra note 35; Adams v.
Clark, op. -ci. supra note 22; Anderson v. Galley, op. cit. supra note 41;
McRoberts v. Spaulding, op. cit. supra note 12; Gamble v. Brown, op. cit. supra
note 24.
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a receiver to apply collections made on excess loans in re-
duction of the excess, and their exoneration if the amount
is reduced within the legal limit." The view has been taken
that the bank has no right to receive the paper where an ex-
cess loan is involved, and if such paper is left among the
assets of the bank by the directors it is only in the nature
of salvage.47
Even among the decisions of the Federal Courts, there
is great confusion and many conflicting opinions regarding
the question of interest. This is due to the fact that there
is a diversity of opinion among the courts regarding the
running of the Statute of Limitations. Some decisions are
to the effect that the directors are liable for interest on the
amounts found due on excess loans from the date of the
transaction. 8 These decisions are for the most part trace-
able to the courts that have adopted the view that the lia-
bility of the director begins and the limitation statute runs,
from the making of the loan. Another line of decisions
allows interest on the amounts found due, from the date
of the institution -of suit against the directors by the re-
ceiver.49 These courts reason that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the directors go out of control
of the bank's affairs. So we see that the question of interest
really hinges upon the courts' construction of excess loan
statutes in regard to the statute of limitations.
3. The Statute of Limitations
Attention has already been called to the fact that there
is division of authority regarding the statute of limitations
and suits against bank directors for excess and negligent
46 Adams v. Clarke, op. cit. supra note 22.
47 Anderson v. Gailey, op. cit. supra note 41.
48 McRoberts v. Spaulding, op. cit. supra note 12.
49 Gamble v. Brown, op. cit. supra note 24. (1928). Generally see: Sig-
well v. City National Bank, 55 S. E. 109 (S. C. 1906); Rogers v. Selleck, 221
N. W. 702 (Neb. 1928); Commercial Bank v. Chatfield, 80 N. W. 712 (Mich.
1899); Bowerman v. Hamner, op. cit. supra note 1; Jones National Bank v. Yates,
60 L. Ed. 788 (1916); Manning v. Campbell, 162 N. E. 770 (Mass. 1928).
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loans, the one view-being that the cause -of action accrues at
the time of making the loan, and the other that the statute
does not begin to run until the directors go out of actual
control of the bank and its business. While these two lines
of decisions are in direct conflict with each other, they seem
to be in accord on the proposition that the defendant di-
rectors become immediately liable for the entire amount of
the excess loan when made." One line of decisions on the
subject of limitation of actions, then more or less logically
concludes that if the cause of action arises with the making
of- the loan, that the statute should begin to -run in favor of
the bank directors at that time. The Corsicana National
Bank case " is an example of this reasoning:
"The damage as well as the injury was complete at that time (the
time of making the loan) and the bank was not obliged to await the
maturity of the notes, -because immediately it became the duty of
the officers or directors who knowingly participated in makihig the
excessive loan to undo the wrong done by taking the notes off the
hands of the bank and restoring to it the money that had been loaned.
Of course, whatever of value the bank recovered from the borrowers
on account of the loan would go in diminution of the damages; but
the responsible officials would have no right to require the bank to
pursue its remedies against the borrowers or await the liquidation of
their estates. The liability imposed by the statute -upon the directors
is a direct liability, not contingent or collateral."
The same view was taken by the court in the case of
Anderson v. Gailey:2
"Whether the conduct of the majority is wise and diligent under all
the circumstances, or wrongful, is oftedi a close question, and con-
troversy over it needs the quieting of limitation as much as any
other controversy. Without it, business men would hesitate to be-
come bank directors . . . I conclude that the alleged acts of making
excess loans or loans insolvent when made more than four years be-
fore suit was brought are barred . . . No fraud or fraudulent con-
cealment appears in these, and failure to use diligence to discover
and enforce liability does appear."
50 Corsicana National Bank v. Johnson, op. cit. supra note 35; Adams v.
Clarke, op. cit. supra note 22; Anderson v. Galley, op. cit. supra note 41.
51 Op. cit. supra note 35.
52 Op. dt. supra note 41.
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The result of applying the rule as above set out in many
instances would not be equitable to the depositors and
creditors of the failed banking institution when put in re-
ceivership. Combined with this fact there is the possible
exception in the law regarding the running of the statute of
limitations after the appointment of a receiver to the effect
that when a receiver is appointed process of law is suspended
and the statute of limitations against ordinary actions does
not apply, lapse of time being important only as it tends to
show laches or unreasonable delay,53 which may form the
basis of another line of decisions in opposition to the one
pointed out.
The case of Adams v. Clarke "' attempts to distinguish
the one before the court and the holding in the Corsiana
National Bank case, on the facts, by arguing that in the
Corsicana National Bank case the directors did not con-
tinue in full control of the bank up to the time it closed
while in the instant case they constitute the entire board
of directors up until the closing of the bank. Part of the
opinion follows:
"This suit was commenced on August 6, 1925, and the majority of
the excess loans involved were made more than three years prior
thereto. The cause of action in such a case is deemed to have arisen
when the excess loan was made. Corsicana National Bank v. John-
son (C. C. A.) 218 F. 822; Id. 251 U. S.'68, 40 S. Ct. 82, 64 L. Ed.
141. And apparently the bank is chargeable with knowledge dis-
closed by its records and the information possessed by its directors.
Curtis v. Connly, supra. But here, during the entire period in ques-
tion, defendants not only held a majority of the capital stock but
constituted the entire board of directors. As trustees in exclusive con-
trol of the bank's affairs, they cannot take advantage of inaction for
which they alone are responsible. Morse On Banks (5th Ed.) §125 ...
"In Cooper v. Hill (C. C. A.) 94 F. 582, Corsicana National Bank
v. Johnson, 251 U. S. 68, 40 S. Ct. 82, 64 L. Ed. 141, and Curtis v.
Connly, 257 U. S. 260, 42 S. Ct. 100, 66 L. Ed. 222, it is pointed
out that the defendants sought to be charged did not continue in
•3 MORSE, Op. cit. supra, Vol. II, p. 1314.
54 Op. Cit. supra note 22.
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full control of the bank up to the time it dosed, but that, though
under no disability, it failed to take action during the limitation
period. In the last case, commenting upon a suggestion that fthe
defendants. 'stood in a fiduciary relation to the bank,' the court said:
'But they were strangers to it when they left the board, more than
six years before this suit was brought.' Our conclusion is that the
action was not barred as to any of the excess loans involved."
So the case of Adams v. Clarke, while it arrived at a dif-
ferent decision than did the Corsicana National Bank case,
did not directly disapprove the reasoning of that case, but
tried to get away from its doctrine by attempting to dis-
tinguish the two cases on the facts.
The case of Schilling v. Parman " strikes squarely at the
doctrine of the Corsicana National Bank case and without'
attempting any distinction on the facts, takes issue with
that decision:
"There is, however, some confusion in the authorities as to whether
the statute of limitations begins to run in favor of the directors at the
time the excess loan is made, or not until there is a loss to the bank
or a change in the management. It is said by Mr. Justice Pitney in
Corsicana National Bank v. Johnson, 251 U. S. 86, 40 S. Ct. 82,
64 L. Ed. 141, that the cause of action against an offending director
accrues at the time the loan is made, and the bank is not required
to wait the maturity of the note or the liquidation of the borrower's
estate before bringing a suit. The statement of the learned justice,
although it does not seem to have been necessary to a decision of
the case before the court, is of course entitled to very great respect.
If, however, the statute of limitations commences to run, regardless
of the circumstances, at the time of the loan, it will enable the di-
rectors of a bank to escape liability for their wrongful acts if they
iemain in control of the bank during the time prescribed by the
statute. Directors are not trustees of an express trust, but they are
trustees of an implied or resulting trust, created by operation*of law
on their official relation to the bank. Cooper v. Hill (C. C. A.) 94
F. 582. Their possession and control of the bank is the possession
and control of their cestui que trust. As long as that relation exists,
there can be no assertion of an adverse claim by the bank, or a suit
brought to remedy the wrong.
55 35 Fed. (2d) 780 (1928).
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"As at present advised, I am of the opinion that the better doctrine
is that in equity the statute of limitations will not run in favor of
the directors'of a bank who have the control and management of its
affairs while they remain in control. National Bank of Commerce v.
Wade (C. C.) 84 F. 10; Rankin v. Cooper (C. C.) 149 F. 1010."
There has been a great deal of criticism of the holding
in the Corsicana National Bank case and other cases sul-
porting that rule. The recent and more modern doctrine
is at variance with the holding and no doubt the decision in
the case of Schilling v. Parman marks the present trend in
both state and Federal Courts as to the statute of limita-
tions respecting the liability of bank directors for statutory
excess loans. With the increasing number of suits by re-
ceivers of defunct banking corporations there is now a ten-
dency of the courts to take away the shield of the statute of
limitations from the directors in favor of their innocent and
blameless depositors. Certainly this is the more equitable
rule.
John A. Skiles.
Lincoln, Nebraska.
